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Nicaragua proudly claims its identity as an agricultural country and boasts its exports of 
coffee,  cheese  and  beans.  But  if  we  observe  the  public  policies  of  the  different 
governments, including the current one, we discover that agriculture has been one of the 
most sidelined sectors since 1990. Over the last two decades many of our policies have 
accepted as an indubitable truth that countries “developed” by abandoning agriculture and 
making an economic transition toward industry and services. They don’t believe the rural 
sector is the motor that’s going to develop our economy.  
 
That indubitable truth is debatable 
Data from reports by both the Central Bank of Nicaragua and the National Institute for 
Development Information (INIDE—formerly the Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics, or INE), 
however, feed the conviction of civil society institutions and networks that banking on this 
transition hasn’t worked. The statistics indicate that Nicaragua has bogged down in both its 
economic  transition  and  its  rural-urban  demographic  transition.  And  regrettably  both 
realities are off the rural sector public policy agenda. 
 
According  to  another  “indisputable  truth”  assumed  by  many,  our  rural  population  is 
dropping  because  it’s  migrating  to  the  cities,  but  population  census  data  indicate  the 
opposite.  There  was  a  ten-year  gap  between  the  last  two  INIDE  censuses  (1995  and 
2005), which makes the data very reliable, and the results tell us that in relative terms the 
rural population only dropped from 45.6% of the total to 44.1%, which isn’t a significant 
change over 10 years. And in absolute numbers, the rural population was 1.97 million in 
1995 and 2.27 million in 2005, which means a 14% increase in the same 10-year period. 
 
We  need  to combine  this  reality  with  the  important  changes in Nicaragua’s  population 
pyramid. The country is entering into the period of opportunity known as the “demographic 
dividend” that Civil Coordinator economist Adolfo Acevedo has been insisting on so much. 
Until  very  recently,  Nicaragua’s  population  pyramid  had  a  very  broad  base  of  young 
children and ever fewer older people toward the peak. Now our pyramid is changing to one 
more  like  other  developing  countries:  the  birth  rate  has  dropped,  so  there’s  a  smaller 
population  of  children  at  the  base,  and  what’s  growing  is  the  working-age  population. 
According to INIDE, by the 2005 census there were fewer children under 5 years old than 
in the 5-9 age group, which in turn had fewer than the 10-14 age group. It is precisely this 
last group that’s known as the demographic dividend because they’re now reaching the 
income-generating age, and, at least in theory, more people of that age per family reduces 
the dependency relationship (the number of minors depending on people of working age). 
But they’re also increasing the economically active population in general, given that life 
expectancy is also increasing so those already in the labor market aren’t rotating out at as 
early an age. 
 
The challenge of jobs and education 
In the longer run, this demographic shift will create a problem like the Baby Boomers in the 
United States, where a huge number of people are retiring, while fewer people are in the 
labor  system  generating  social  security  or  pension  funds.  But  in  this  transition  period, Nicaragua’s challenge is to provide enough employment for those reaching working age. 
Using census data, an average of 130,310 young people came of working age (15 and up) 
every year between 2005 and 2010, and the annual average will be 129,000 in the 2011-
2015 period. That means that in five years—one government term—the State must be 
able to generate some 650,000 new jobs just to cover the demand of our youth, 330,000 of 
whom are from rural areas.  
 
We must also contrast these data with Nicaragua’s education statistics. According to the 
2005 census, only 7% of the population is going on to university. This means that the vast 
majority of  young high  school  graduates must immediately  get  a job, which  they  don’t 
manage to do. We also know that far less of the rural population continues on to get a 
higher education (barely 1.1%), or even goes to high school (only 13%), with even fewer 
graduating. 
 
It  should  be  recalled  that  the  rural  education  system  is  based  on  multi-grade  primary 
schools  up  to  fourth  grade.  After  that  boys  and  girls  have  to  travel  long  distances  to 
complete the last two primary grades, and then have to move to a population nucleus to 
find a secondary school. Because of this dismal educational situation, 65,000 rural youths 
need to find a job each year. They represent our demographic dividend, but the major 
beneficiary will very probably be Costa Rica given how many of our young people migrate 
there each year to find temporary work. Nicaragua’s first major structural challenge, then, 
is to take advantage of our demographic dividend by providing those youths with academic 
and technical training to get a decent job. And that challenge is even more pressing in the 
rural sector.  
 
Are maquilas an answer? 
The government of Enrique Bolaños posited that maquilas—plants that assemble imported 
raw  materials  and  re-export  the  assembled  goods—would  resolve  the  challenge  of 
providing  massive  employment.  His  team  calculated  that  with  CAFTA,  the  free  trade 
agreement the Central American countries negotiated with the United States in 2004 and 
put in force since 2006, maquilas would arrive en masse and everyone would find work.  
 
But those optimistic calculations didn’t pan out. According to the projections, the maquilas 
in  Nicaragua  should  be  producing  US$2.28  million  in  gross  exports  by  now  and  their 
infrastructure should have increased four-fold since 2006. The calculations were wrong. In 
2010  they  only  exported  US$1.23  million  worth  and  the  infrastructure  only  doubled. 
Gambling on resolving the employment problem with the maquilas, the government put all 
its eggs in one basket, and stopped attending other sectors. That basket is currently failing 
to generate enough employment even to cover one year of the demographic dividend: in 
2010, those sweatshops generated only 89,927 direct jobs. 
    
The agricultural sector is underrated 
Because I  favor  the  rural  approach  for  Nicaragua,  the  development  path  via  maquilas 
seems to me much less valuable than the development path via the countryside. But don’t 
get me wrong; it’s not only about some feeling of empathy with the rural world. The Central 
Bank figures back this conviction. Even by 2010, agriculture as a primary sector occupied 
32.2% of all employment, ensuring some 834,200 jobs in the country. And if one considers 
that 70% of our industrial sector is agroindustry (meat, sugar and dairy products), one can 
conclude  that  between  35%  and  38%  of  our  country’s  jobs  depends  on  agricultural 
production.  
 
This figure needs to be a cornerstone of discussions about job-generating sectors. And 
here’s another: 61% of our exports come from the agricultural sector: 35% of them primary 
exports and 26% agroindustrial products. Yet despite the numerical evidence, there are 
still  public  officials  who  deny  that  the  agricultural  sector  could  be  the  motor  force  of 
Nicaragua’s development. 
 
If  the  country’s  main  problem  is  unemployment,  as  all  polls  demonstrate,  our  public 
policies should favor a lead sector that generates jobs and self-employment. We already 
know that the manufacturing sector, the maquila sector, isn’t doing this. We also know that 
the  service  sector  isn’t  doing  it  either,  even  though  Central  Bank  statistics  suggest  it 
provides  the  most  jobs  (52%)  because  over  half  of  them  (53%)  are  defined  as 
underemployment. What does that mean? It means that in reality 13.7% of those workers 
are only partially employed, some of them having only worked a week in the past three 
months. And even the other 32.5% who are fully employed earn very little. The rampant 
underemployment in the cities explains why people aren’t coming from the countryside. 
Many figure that they’d be even poorer in the city, where everything must be bought and 
sold, than they are in their rural communities. 
 
Even the trade policy complicates the sector 
To demonstrate that our agriculture is the champion in any context, we also must bear in 
mind that Nicaragua’s trade policy since 1991 has severely complicated the rural sector’s 
existence, yet even 19 years after some of these state decisions, no one can deny the 
important weight of the agricultural sector. In 1991 the government decided that Nicaragua 
should totally free up its economy, which basically meant dropping our “defenses,” our 
import tariffs. This decision produced a radical change. For example, the average nominal 
tariff protection for the agricultural products we were importing from the United States in 
1991 was 67.9%. In 2003, even before CAFTA was signed, that tariff barrier had dropped 
to 6.2%. That’s why, when many people were debating whether we should enter CAFTA or 
not, worried about how dangerous it would be to drop our defenses, others of us said, 
“Hold on! We already dropped them a long time ago, and in exchange for nothing! Now it’s 
about getting them to open up!”  
 
At least CAFTA and the Association Agreement with the European Union (AA) triggered 
some controversy. Many other free trade agreements have snuck in under cover of night, 
seriously affecting our rural sector without a word from anyone. Who remembers the now 
10-year-old free trade agreement with Mexico, which made all food products we import 
from there  duty  free? How  can  our  people compete  with  that? It’s  no easy  task if  we 
consider that our diet is very similar to that of Mexicans so they also produce what we do. Today our agricultural producers, already under siege from so many other problems, are 
also burdened with having to compete with all the food products we import from Mexico. 
And if that weren’t enough, we also have trade agreements with Chile, Taiwan, Canada, 
Panama, the Dominican Republic… all of which affect us one way or another. The one 
with Mexico is the most worrying, however, because its conditions are already signed, in 
effect and leaving our agricultural sector at a great disadvantage. 
 
Free trade agreements are signed to be developed over 15 years. That being the case, 
how  are  we  preparing  our  farmers  for  when  we’ll  supposedly  be  in  equal  conditions, 
according  to  these  agreements,  with  zero  import  duty  barriers?  How  much  did  the 
government prepare Nicaraguan farmers for the free trade agreement with Mexico? How 
much has been invested in preparing them for any of the already approved agreements? 
And in the case of CAFTA, how much is being invested in the complementary agenda? 
Knowing that there are groups in the rural sector that will be vulnerable to the changes free 
trade will generate, what are we doing to strengthen them? Considering that when CAFTA 
was  signed,  Nicaragua  was  expected  to  turn  into  a  huge  maquila,  which  clearly  isn’t 
happening, how are we preparing our productive rural sector for these changes?  
 
Attracting and protecting foreign investment 
Free  trade  agreements  always  have  a  chapter  that  refers  to  attracting  and  protecting 
foreign investment. Based on those privileges, foreign investors have been taking over the 
service sector in Nicaragua. Tourism, telecommunications and other services are now in 
the hands of foreign investors.  
 
Attracting foreign investment also affects our national markets through the arrival of these 
companies,  even  transnational  corporations,  in  our  economy.  The  Palí  and  La  Unión 
supermarket  chains  have  already  been  bought  up  by  the  powerful  US-based  Walmart 
giant. And that implies changes and requirements for the agricultural products sold there. 
Only  producers  who  have  the  resources  to  deal  with  these  changes  and  meet  these 
requirements can break into those two commercialization channels; those who can’t will 
quickly be excluded. And as those chains gain increasing weight in the urban distribution 
of  foodstuffs,  displacing  local  neighborhood  outlets,  the  market  for  those  excluded 
producers will shrink even further. 
 
We have a cartel economy, not a market economy 
Nor is domestic commercial policy, which fosters internal markets for goods and services, 
very friendly to our agricultural sector. However much we may hear that there’s a “market” 
economy in Nicaragua, it’s not really true because the Nicaraguan economy doesn’t fulfill 
the basic require¬ments of this model, which is to have competitive markets. What we 
have is a cartel economy, though that word sounds bad to today’s ears because it’s almost 
exclusively linked to the illicit drug trade. In fact, the word began to be used very frequently 
starting in the seventies, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
began to set oil prices based on what its member countries wanted to earn rather than on 
their production costs.  
 
In economics, a cartel is an economic group that defines a product’s prices. An interesting 
work by Mario de Franco, who headed up the agricultural ministry in the first years of the 
Alemán administration, calculates the power that some economic groups have in sectors of our economy. He shows that only two companies control 85.6% of all sugar exports, 
which means that any sugar producer has to go through them. In the case of coffee, an 
extremely important product in our economy, three companies control 88.5% of exports. 
Another three control 63.7% of dairy exports and four control 89.1% of beef exports. The 
market for basic grains (beans and maize) is more competitive, because so far no one has 
managed to control it. 
 
Let’s look at beef 
I’ll use the case of beef to help us better understand what it means for a cartel to control 
market prices. In 2009-2010 Nicaragua experienced a depression in national cattle and 
beef prices; which we were told was due to the international crisis. While there was indeed 
a small dip that year (from $3.32/kg in 2008 to $3.23/kg in 2009), prices were actually 
much higher than in 2007 ($3.02/kg). Nicaragua even exported more in 2009, and at a 
good price, enjoying a volume increase of 15% (71,310 tons) and a 9.5% increase in value 
over  2008.  Despite  all  this,  beef  was  never  cheaper  in  the  national  market  but  the 
producers for that market experienced a serious crisis that affected their financial relations; 
they fell into arrears and had to sell their animals to the highest bidder, of course at very 
low prices.  
 
So what really happened? Although we have no way to prove it, everything indicates that 
there was an agreement among the four companies that control the beef market to lower 
domestic  cattle  prices.  They  feared  that  what  happened  to  those  who  control  the  iron 
market—they  bought  dear  and  had  to  sell  cheap—would  happen  to  them.  To  protect 
themselves, they decided to let the loss fall on the national cattle raisers. The catch was 
that because there was no major drop in international beef prices in the end, or a rise in 
domestic cattle prices, what they created was a greater profit margin for the ones who 
control this activity—themselves. 
 
Overall trends indicate that the prices of all foods will remain high. One thing international 
cooperation has done very well in Nicaragua is ensure that almost all coffee-producing 
cooperatives  have  instant  information  on  international  coffee  prices,  allowing  them  to 
negotiate in better conditions. The situation among cattle raisers is different: they aren’t as 
well organized and depend on industrial processing that isn’t in their hands. As long as 
there’s no union and the beef businessmen aren’t obliged to negotiate in other conditions, 
the raisers won’t be able to get a larger slice of the final prices to the consumer, because 
no businessperson is going to renounce his profit rates out of the goodness of his heart.  
 
The structural problems monopolies cause 
Cartel economies generate  very  serious  structural problems.  In Nicaragua, monopolies 
and oligopolies are legal. And we know that they are one of the worst problems for market 
economies. Similar effects can also be seen in the case of the rice monopoly. There was a 
noticeably rapid growth in both international rice prices and consumer rice prices in 2007 
through 2010, while the price paid to Nicaragua’s national rice producers remained stable, 
with  only  a  very  slight  increase.  Who  ended  up  with  the  difference?  It’s  simple:  one 
company in Nicaragua controls not only 70% of the rice we import but also 70% of the rice 
produced  and  distributed  nationally.  That  permits  this  single  company  to  define  the 
domestic prices paid to our growers.  
 When Central America’s agricultural promotion strategy was being debated, we discussed 
the effects of the cartel economy with a high-level official of the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Commerce (MIFIC). She said that “we can’t touch that; we’d get into a huge 
problem.” She insisted that the reason they can’t touch it is that Nicaragua’s is a market 
economy, not a planned economy, but I responded that “one can read in any economics 
book that the State must intervene in monopoly situations to ensure that prices fluctuate 
with the market.” With that she cut off the conversation, saying, “It’s a very complicated 
topic.”  
 
The fact is that it’s a structural problem our farmers face every day. It’s at the center of the 
forgotten  agenda,  the  one  that  isn’t  discussed  openly,  because  these  topics  are  “very 
complicated.” 
 
I believe the current government is clear about the problem the monopolies represent and 
knows something has to be done to intervene with regard to prices. In 2008, when food 
prices shot up, the State put posts stocked by ENABAS, the State’s basic food storage 
and distribution center, in the barrios to sell red beans and other basic staples at prices 
equivalent to 60% of the market price. It was an important reduction, but the State doesn’t 
have  the  storage  capacity  to  maintain  a  stable  flow  of  foods  in  these  posts.  But  it’s 
learning, and rapidly. In 2011, seeing oil prices shoot up—which in turn always triggers a 
serious  rise  in  food  prices—it  quickly  acted  to  control  the  export  of  red  beans  to  El 
Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras in order to ensure that enough beans stay in the 
country  to  maintain  stable  prices. If  export  were  permitted, the  prices would rise  even 
more. Nonetheless, that was a temporary measure and doesn’t respond to the demands of 
the rural sector’s structural problems. 
 
We’ve  seen  that  despite  all  these  constraints  faced  by  the  agricultural  sector,  it’s  the 
principal provider of both exports and jobs. In addition, statistics tell us that the industrial 
sector hasn’t functioned as expected and that the most important part of the service sector 
is  in  foreign  hands,  while  most  jobs  in  that  sector  are  part-time  or  rank  as  under-
employment.  Given  this  evidence,  we  have  to  consider  that  some  policies,  however 
“complicated”  they  may  be,  need  to  be  decided  on  and  implemented  to  allow  the 
agricultural sector to grow at a pace that at least guarantees rural employment. 
 
Inequality in land access 
Another structural problem revealed by the INIDE data, which is both a serious limitation to 
development of the agricultural sector and part of the forgotten public policy agenda for 
this sector, is the inequality in land access. Nicaragua has one of the highest levels in this 
respect, which is very serious, because we firmly believe that if we don’t change the land 
tenure structure there will be no sustainable reduction of rural poverty. We’ve conducted 
many surveys and they all indicate that there’s a direct relationship between the amount of 
land people have to produce on and the income available to them.  
 
According to the 2001 agricultural census, 75% of farmers are smallholders who only have 
access to 20% of the land being exploited. Another 10% are large landowners who control 
40%, while the 15% with the remaining 40% of the land are medium-sized owners. But 
there’s a forgotten statistic in these numbers: the landless. How many are there? The 
government knows but never reveals this statistic.  
 We’ve  asked INIDE  directly,  but they  haven’t given  us  an  answer. Even  without  exact 
figures, however, we can have a go at calculating it: the 2001 agrarian census shows 
200,000 farming families in the country,  while the population census tells us there are 
431,500 rural households. Shouldn’t the landless families be fairly close to the difference 
between those two figures? INIDE’s official position is that it’s not a valid calculation, but 
we  still  believe  the  number  of  landless  rural  households  is  around  200,000-215,000, 
because it’s quite close to the 45-50% of the rural population without land that we’ve found 
in our district sweep surveys.  
 
According to the 2001 census, the land tenure structure by that year had already gone 
back very close to what it was during the Somoza times, in 1971. We’re expecting the data 
from the agricultural census being taken this year to show even greater land concentration 
in  even fewer  hands.  Even  before  that  census  we  had  already  began  to  speak  of  an 
“agrarian counter-reform.” But public policy isn’t taking this reality into account either; it’s 
another central point on that forgotten agenda. 
 
So what does all this add up to? A large number of young people who need jobs and only 
have agriculture to absorb them, and at the same time a high concentration of agricultural 
land, with 25% of the property owners controlling 80% of it. To paint an even grimmer 
picture, we’re “eating up” the biological reserve areas. Anyone who travels to the Bosawás 
reserve,  the  largest  in  Central  America,  can  see  that  its  entire  buffer  zone  is  already 
converted into pasture land. In the sixties, we naively believed we could continue cutting 
down forests and creating agricultural lands all the way to the Caribbean, but now we 
know we can’t. These are not only structural issues that seriously affect agriculture, but 
also thorny ones public policymakers don’t want to touch.  
 
Is another agrarian reform the answer? 
The land issue is an enormous unresolved structural challenge. We’re talking about no 
fewer than a million people who live in rural areas and have no land to produce on. What 
are we doing to enable them to produce, have jobs, grow their own food? There’s still no 
answer.  
 
I know people develop serious allergies to any mention of agrarian reform. One of the 
main arguments that trigger them is that a number of squatters who received land have 
sold it, creating a business in land.  
 
I believe some lessons from the agrarian reform of the eighties and the counter-reform of 
the  nineties  are  worth  examining.  In  the  years  of  the  greatest  agrarian  counter-reform 
(1994-1996)  we  could  see  that  the  communities  that  hung  on  to  the  lands  they  had 
received were those that had water to grow grains, while the households that ended up 
with cattle land, which requires a certain capital investment, ended up selling it because 
they couldn’t make that investment. That tells us that access to land is important, but not 
enough. Whether or not people sell the land depends a lot on its crop-producing quality 
and on access to technological and financial services for exploiting it. We in Nitlapán have 
identified a type of household we call “poor peasant with land.” These are people with 35 
hectares, but only around 1.4 of them are suitable for growing grains. Since they also have no access to financial services adapted to their condition, their economy and their life is 
limited  to  surviving  on  what  those  1.4  hectares  produce. Because  they  can’t  invest  in 
livestock themselves, they rent the rest for cattle or leave it fallow. In short, despite having 
a decent chunk of land, these families maintain a subsistence economy. 
 
An interesting diversification process has been taking place in La Dalia, department of 
Matagalpa, where people are dedicating part of their plot to basic grains and part to coffee, 
but the coffee’s in such a bad state that a major investment would have to be made to 
resuscitate it. Some will therefore surely sell the coffee land for lack of investment money 
and  hold  on  to  the  basic  grain  land.  These  are  the  complexities  that  grow  out  of  the 
agricultural reform of the eighties.  
 
Some people actually  make a living from the land business, and I’m not talking about 
realtors. There are people who get land one way or another in one place, then sell it to go 
somewhere  else  and  repeat  the  process.  This also  happens  because  there’s  no  clear 
registry of land beneficiaries. I personally know former military officers who were given 
lands in Timal and are now demanding land elsewhere. How’s that possible? The only 
explanation is that there’s no basic registry of agrarian reform beneficiaries over the years 
or apparently even of retiring military personnel given land after the war.  
 
How can we improve financing to the rural sector? 
Since 2006 we’ve been proposing a progressive tax on land tenure, which opens up a 
series of policy options. We can’t keep using the model of 7 hectares of pasture to feed a 
cow or young bull. If farmers had to pay more for the land it would oblige them to use it 
efficiently or sell it. Obviously the target group for this measure would be the 10% of large 
land owners. Such a measure would open interesting windows of opportunity; for example 
areas  that  are  forested  and/or  left  fallow  for  natural  forest  regeneration  could  be 
exonerated from the tax calculation. There would be many advantages to such a measure, 
but it would require the government to act against that 10% of large landowners, which is 
dicey because they are one of the country’s economic and political power groups. 
 
To ensure greater agricultural development, financing would also have to be ensured for 
production. Since the early nineties, the Nicaraguan banking sector has basically given 
priority  to  consumer  credits.  It  was  in  response  to  that  policy  that  micro-financing 
institutions (MFIs) sprang up to make credit available to the agricultural sector, which the 
banks  considered  “risky  and  with  no  real  collateral.”  By  2008,  the  MFIs  had  a  credit 
portfolio totaling some US$246 million, 52% of which was placed in agricultural production. 
By comparison, Banco Produzcamos, which the government created to provide financing 
to the rural sector, opened its doors last year with a US$50 million portfolio. That means 
that  the  MFIs  were  already  circulating  a  portfolio  2.5  times  greater  than  the  state 
development  bank.  Everyone  welcomed  the  creation  of  Banco  Produzcamos,  because 
there’s plenty of space in the sector and a lot of need for financing, but this bank is new, is 
applying serious restrictions on the credit it’s providing to avoid arrears and is only placing 
small amounts. 
 
Another recent government solution to rural financing is the ALBA CARUNA state credit 
and savings cooperative, fed with Venezuelan cooperation funds. According to information from the umbrella Micro-financiers Association of Nicaragua (ASOMIF), this cooperation 
has the córdoba equivalent of some $392 million to place this year, although it’s hard to 
get exact figures on how much it’s placing, in what form, in which areas and with what 
recovery levels, because the government isn’t providing that information.  
 
For years CARUNA was a tiny non-governmental MFI (microfinance institution) with very 
limited  capacity  and  growth  that  was  a  member  of  ASOMIF.  Then  suddenly,  with  this 
government, it has had a massive injection of money from Venezuelan aid. But given its 
institutional  history,  it  has  to  be  very  difficult  for  it  to  place  that  enormous  amount  of 
money, which is more than the highest amount ASOMIF’s 19 institutional members have 
ever had for their 350,400 clients. ALBA CARUNA is currently financing cooperatives as a 
second-tier institution, which I imagine is the most efficient way it has, because the coops 
place,  monitor  and  recover  the  funds  with  their  own  members  using  their  own 
mechanisms,  which  both  saves  CARUNA  operating  costs  and  allows  it  to  expand  its 
coverage. The question is whether it will be able to efficiently place such a huge amount of 
money, which is 7.8 times bigger than Banco Produzcamos’ current portfolio. 
 
The Non-Payment Movement 
In this structural context of limited financing for the rural sector, a huge storm cloud began 
gathering in 2008 that is still hanging over the entire rural economy: it was quickly dubbed 
the Non-Payment Movement, but later started calling itself Producers of the North. There’s 
no  clarity  about  how  many  farmers  and  ranchers  are  associated  with  this  movement, 
although it claims to represent more than 13,758 clients of 67 MFIs and regulated banks 
with a total debt of US$25 million. Even after nearly three years, its problem hasn’t yet 
been resolved and, independent of one’s sympathy with it or lack thereof, the movement 
has generated a very grave crisis for the rural sector and the country as a whole. 
 
The government responded so ambiguously to the emergence of this movement that it 
was  open  to  many  interpretations,  one  of  which  was  that  the  government  actually 
supported it. The movement’s initial proposal was a restructuring of their debts with 10 
years to pay and an annual interest rate of 8%. As a form of pressure, members of the 
movement took over installations of some MFIs, damaging and even burning some down. 
Following that the National Assembly passed a moratorium law to resolve the problem, but 
it did little good since only 7.3% of the 5,000 clients covered by it actually abided by the 
law’s restructuring conditions.  
 
The ongoing effects of the Non-Payment Movement have been very negative. Some MFIs 
reached arrears rates of over 20%, which had never before happened in their previous 10 
years of existence. As a result, many moved their credits into consumption, abandoning 
rural production altogether; by last year the overall agricultural portfolio had shrunk 35.8% 
below  its  2008  levels.  Based  on  this  situation,  the  IDB  lowered  Nicaragua’s  business 
climate rating from 6th to 13th place and its investment climate rating from 13th to 34th 
place.  As  a  result,  the  total  MFI  credit  portfolio  had  dropped  from  US$246  million  to 
US$176 million by the close of last year, a $70 million loss, severely affecting the micro-
financing system as a whole. And that isn’t all. One of the most serious problems that the 
MFIs—and  thus  borrowers—are  facing  right  now  is  that  the  money  they  receive  from solidarity financiers in Europe to capitalize their operations are not only arriving in smaller 
amounts but also at higher interest rates because of the greater risks involved in getting a 
return  on  their investments. To that is  added the  higher  cost of  placement  due to  the 
continued possibility of both damage to their installations and failure to pay, which meant 
that MFIs have to work with interest rates of 16% and screen potential clients even more 
carefully. It’s a situation in which the innocent are paying much more than the guilty. 
 
How is the Non-Payment Movement responding to the chain of events it unleashed? After 
demanding  a  restructuring  that  it  then  refused  to  accept,  it  has  changed  its  position. 
Hitching its wagon to Daniel Ortega’s electoral star, it’s now demanding that the State buy 
its debt from the financial sector, pledging in return to pay it in a decade and to vote for 
him  in  November.  If  that  happens,  the  financial  sector  will  recover  its  capital,  but  a 
negative precedent will be set and similar groups with similar demands and pressures 
could well appear again in the next municipal or national elections. In addition, if their 
behavior so far is any indication, there’s no assurance that in 10 years they’ll honor their 
debt with Nicaragua’s taxpayers.  
The government’s priority is food security 
Given all these problems, the governing party has set reduction of food insecurity as its 
priority for fighting poverty and extreme poverty for this period and surely the next one if it 
wins the elections. To fulfill this goal it has decided to bank on programs that help people 
improve their food intake, whether by producing grains or receiving food subsidies.  
 
The government has dedicated its main efforts to improving the nutrition of the rural sector. 
To that end it has announced that its main intervention in the agricultural sector this year 
will be seed distribution. The goal is to provide some 53,928 quintals of bean, maize and 
sorghum  seeds  to  91,600  growers,  guaranteeing  the  production  of  roughly  64,610 
hectares of grains.  
 
The  government  has  made  a  major  investment  in  Nicaragua’s  Institute  of  Agricultural 
Technology (INTA) to guarantee seeds that produce in times of drought, taking the effects 
of climate change into account. They aren’t genetically modified seeds, but rather hybrids; 
so far as we know, INTA isn’t working with transgenics. The government also plans to 
distribute food to some 56,000 people considered especially vulnerable (pregnant women 
and undernourished children) and to attend to another 42,500 people through the food-for-
work modality.  
 
The Zero Hunger Program 
The government also plans to give out the Zero Hunger program’s “productive bond” to 
another 33,300 women this year. This would put it close to its initial target of covering 
75,000 families with that bond, enabling them to raise their nutrition level in animal and 
vegetable protein. 
 
The debate is still open about whether the Zero Hunger program will allow beneficiary 
families  to  eventually  climb  out  of  poverty.  In  the  short  run,  the  bond  recipients  are 
capitalized because they receive animals and seeds. The open question in the longer run is whether what they receive through the program will produce a structural change. The 
government is gambling that it will and has thus charged the Rural Development Institute 
(IDR) with the mission of organizing 10,000 beneficiary families into cooperatives. The 
idea is that this would help them begin to improve their income, inserting themselves into 
agroindustrial chains that add value to the production of basic grains, milk, beef and cacao 
generated by the bond. 
 
The Zero Hunger package is given only to women and only to families with a minimum of 
0.7 hectares of land). This again raises the question about what programs there are for the 
thousands of landless families. If the answer is that the food-for-work program is aimed at 
them,  the  State  will  have  to  multiply  that  intervention,  because  as  currently  planned  it 
would barely cover 10% of them. 
 
A positive change for the IDR 
The IDR (Rural Development Institute) is undergoing an important structural change. Since 
its creation its role has been to administer all government rural projects; it was known as 
the administrator of the presidential project portfolio. Now the government has entrusted it 
with a more specific function: to direct and execute the agroindustrial development policy 
in the rural sector. This is a very positive change, providing it with a specific function and a 
clear public policy goal for the sector. 
 
It  will  be  quite  a  challenge  for  the  IDR  to  transform subsistence  growers  into  farmers 
integrated into agro¬industrial chains, mainly given the dispersed distribution of the Zero 
Hunger bonds. So far it’s only a very risky hypothesis that the IDR will be able to establish 
agroindustries with the bond beneficiaries; it’ll be a while before we can tell if it worked. We 
have  a  lot  of  reservations,  because  the  beneficiaries’  current  land  tenure  means  their 
production volumes will continue to be small, and if the financing remains limited it won’t 
be possible to obtain a productive dynamic in the short run that would justify an investment 
in agroindustry. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture now has all Zero Hunger beneficiaries “on line” and is using this 
information to respond to the demand for transparency. What we don’t know is whether 
there has been a constant monitoring system appraising how these beneficiaries have 
made use of the bond. Monitoring is always a question of resources. During the Bolaños 
government the Ministry of Agriculture was reduced to a minimal expression because it 
was converted into a policy think tank, which didn’t require many people. In 2007, with the 
change of government, the ministry was asked not only to both think about but also to 
implement  policies—an  enormous  package  all  over  the  country.  That  obviously 
represented  a  transcendental  change,  which  is  why  the  first  two  years  involved  many 
adjustments and headaches. 
 
Taking this transition into account, it’s our under¬standing that the government is going to 
develop the monitoring of Zero Hunger results starting this year, charging the IDR with 
adding value to the bond’s products. A lot will depend on how big a budget the ministry, 
the IDR and INTA will be assigned to do all this. In 2009, when budgetary cuts had to be 
made, the ministry lost close to $9.5 million, and the IDR budget was cut by nearly $1.3 
million, while the new development bank’s $50 million didn’t come into play that year. Last 
year the IDR lost another $5.3 million. The fact that the rural sector has always been in the 
front line of budget cuts gives an idea of its public policy priority. 
 The structural problems have to be attacked 
Guaranteeing the poorest people better nutrition is unquestionably a positive objective. But 
if  the  government  limits  itself  to  that  intervention  level,  it  will  only  be  attacking  the 
symptoms, not the illness itself. If it doesn’t resolve the structural problems, the machinery 
that produces poverty and inequality in the countryside will continue to operate.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture is still a key institution, which is why some 10 years ago the 
need was identified to organize both the institution and its policies territorially. The current 
government has begun to create departmental production cabinets, which is an important 
step, but that decision must be accompanied by human and material resources and a 
budget  that  allows  the  departmental  delegates  to  negotiate  effectively  with  local 
stakeholders.  There  has  to  be  a  break  with  the  centralist  and  top-down  view  that 
everything  must  be  in  Managua;  transferring  only  functions  to  the  department, 
unaccompanied  by  resources,  is  mere  deconcentration,  whereas  Nicaragua  needs 
genuine decentralization.  
 
How will we know if we’re on the right track?  
How can we know if we’re moving toward the dreamed-of goal of rural development? I 
propose looking at two key indicators: rural wages and the proportion of the consumer 
price that stays with the national producer.  
 
Rural wages.  
While rural wages depend on the area of the country, they currently average around 30-40 
córdobas a day (between $1.50 and $2), although in places with more rural jobs workers 
earn up to $2.25.  
 
Sociologist Eduardo Baumeister, an experienced analyst of Nicaragua’s rural sector, has 
estimated that  while a rural  worker  can  average  $2.50  a  day  in  Nicaragua,  that  same 
worker doing the same work in Costa Rica pulls $7, even after social security deductions. 
Because Costa Rica’s rural labor force is smaller, farm owners are obliged to offer better 
wages to get people to work for them. When analyzing the migratory flows from Nicaragua 
to Costa Rica, one discovers that nearly 40% of all Nicaraguan workers on Costa Rican 
plantations come from urban areas. That suggests that if there were decent rural wages in 
Nicaragua,  those  same  workers  would  stay  here  and  decide  to  work  in  agriculture, 
reversing domestic migration and slowing the emigration to Costa Rica. 
 
Consumer prices to the producer.  
What  advantages  have  been  provided  by  opening  Venezuela’s  market  to  Nicaraguan 
products? For one, it certainly helped Nicaragua resist the US financial crisis better and 
with  fewer  problems.  In  fact,  exports  to  the  United  States  have  also  been  dropping 
because El Salvador, which together with Honduras and Costa Rica is an important priority 
for our food exports, is demanding a lot of food from us. But the fact that we’re exporting to 
Venezuela at what was announced as a “fair price” doesn’t mean our rural farmers or rural 
workers are earning more.  
 
Venezuela  is  paying  a  better  price  for  what  we  export  to  it.  According  to  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  reports,  Venezuela  paid  US$4.075/kg  for  beef  in  2010  and  this  year  is 
expected to pay US$4.45. But that doesn’t necessarily mean the “fair price” gets all the 
way to the national cattle raiser, much less the ranch hand. Wherever possible, the four 
owners of the exporting slaughterhouses that monopolize the activity pocket those extra 
40 or 50 cents.   
These big companies will only be forced to pay better prices and better wages when they 
have to look for workers in a setting of greater employment, when no one will work for 
them unless they’re paid well. And also when our rulers start to hinder cartels and the price 
games they foment.  
 
The  key  indictors  I  proposed  for  knowing  whether  there’s  a  real  commitment  to  rural 
development also applies to trade with Venezuela. If the producers increase their share of 
the consumer price and rural wages grow, it will mean that the rural sector and the country 
as  a  whole  are  in  a  dynamic  of  inclusive  development.  If  both  indicators  remain  low, 
stagnant,  the  benefits  are  clearly  being  siphoned  off  by  the  economic  groups  that 
concentrate the wealth in our country.  
 
According to the 2010 Central Bank report, real agricultural wages—calculated in constant 
1994  córdobas—fell  5.6%  in  2009,  from  912.30  córdobas  to  861.40.  This  is  alarming 
because it’s lower than the average agricultural wage in both 2007 (926 córdobas) and 
2006 (960 córdobas), and implies that there’s no tendency toward structural change with 
this government. That will continue to be the case as long as the rural agenda and its key 
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